








This paper uses  immigration as a  case  study  to examine whether a qualitative 
approach to content analysis can offer a different perspective on policy discourse 
than  that  provided  by  quantitative  analysis.    In  examining  the  Canadian 
elections of 2004, 2006 and 2008, it finds evidence that immigration was a much 
greater  issue  at  both  a  riding‐level  and  within  certain  communities  than 
evidenced in a large‐N study.  It suggests that issues surrounding identity may be 
‘permanent’  top‐of‐mind  issues  for  some  voters,  and  that  the  reason  minor 
campaign  incidents  sometimes  garner  disproportionate  attention  is  because 




1960s,  and  how  historical  and  rich  contextual  approaches  came  to  be  discarded  in  favour  of 




necessary  for  a  holistic  understanding  of  politics  (Thelen  and  Steinmo,  1992).    Of  course,  the 
methodological  debate  surrounding  qualitative  and  quantitative,  including  the  more  recent 
infatuation  with  experiments,  continues  to  divide  the  discipline,  as  it  does  all  fields  of  academic 
inquiry. 
Some have  tried  to bridge  the quantitative‐qualitative divide by  suggesting  that  the  two  sides need 
only  adopt  a  common  language,  though  less  usefully  they  equally  recommend  that  the  common 
language be quantitative and admonish all researchers to increase their ‘N’ (e.g. King et al., 2001).  In 
response,  it  has  been  argued  that  through  qualitative  examination  one  has  access  to  an  almost 
                                                             










The reason for this  is because this  field of  inquiry only relatively recently emerged.   There has been 
sufficient time to experience a partial pendulum swing in terms of findings, but it  lacks the longevity 




for  the  state  in  an  era  of  war  and  cold  war,  with  entire  government  ministries  devoted  to  its 
implementation.  This conclusion was challenged by early quantitative researchers who found minimal 
media effects when  they began exploring  voting behaviour.    The media,  it was  concluded, did  little 
more than reinforce existing public opinion (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948; Berleson et al., 1954). 
Quantitative  research  found  evidence  that  people  resisted  the  media  by  filtering  what  they  were 
exposed to  through their own biases  (Surlin and Tate, 1979; Brigham and Giesbrecht, 1976; Soroka, 
2000); and these biases caused them to only consider information that conformed to their own views 
(Hur  and Robinson,  1983;  Ball‐Rokeach  et  al.,  1981).    As  an  alternative,  a  number  of  limited media 





‘frame’  an  issue  by,  for  example,  using  episodic  or  thematic  news  frames  that  implicitly  connect 
responsibility for policy and for political action to individuals or to society (Iyengar, 1991).  Media may 
also be impacting on different segments of the population differently; with, for example, people with 
medium  amounts  of  information  being  prone  to  greater  influence  than  those  with  high  levels  of 
information (Zaller, 1992, 1996). 
As quantitative researchers have been largely left alone to explore these ideas in response to the early 
qualitative  forays,  one might  be  left  with  the  impression  that  qualitative  conclusions  are  naturally 
prone to error simply because they are qualitative.  Or one might conclude that qualitative insights are 
useful  only  for  suggesting  hypothesis which  can  later  be  ‘tested’.    After  all,  Plato’s  ‘allegory  of  the 
cave’  led  to  Lippman’s  idea  of  ‘pictures  in  their  heads’  and  this  in  turn  suggested  the  plethora  of 
research questions around framing, priming and agenda setting that have and continue to be tested. 
Yet it is just as possible that qualitative research may offer insights that are materially different from 
what might  emerge  through  quantitative  research.    If  true,  this  is  important  for  not  only  a  healthy 
methodological debate, but also for the study of politics and for the proper functioning of society as 
the academy is  increasingly offering its expertise to the public and the media  it  is studying.   Large‐N 
studies of the media have joined their cousins, the public opinion poll,  in offering a lens by which to 












this not  to  be  a  significant  election  issue.    Yet  the popular  press  has,  in  each of  these  three  recent 





we  will  be  looking  for  unique  insights  that  a  qualitative  approach  might  provide  to  support  the 









While  not  a  formal  objective,  the Observatory  has  also  been  focused  on  trying  to  eliminate  coding 




general  tone  towards  the  leaders  and  parties, were  the  secondary  areas  of  coding.    In  the  case  of 
leaders and parties, positioning in the story (i.e. first, second or third) was recorded and coders were 




if  the  story  itself may have been  a  report  of  a  negative or  positive  campaign development  for  that 
leader or party. 
While this coding approach was based on that adopted by Robinson & Sheehan (1983), it differs in one 







In  2008,  a  computer  program was  introduced  to  search  text  for  key words  and  then weight  these 





28th,  inclusive,  and  in  2006,  between  November  29th  and  January  21st,  inclusive,  and  during  those 
years  the newspapers  coded were  the Globe and Mail, National Post, Toronto Star, Calgary Herald, 








Magazine  in 2006 and 2008,  though these were not contractual nor exclusive,  so additional  reports 
were  published  elsewhere.    At  least  one  paper  summarizing  the  overall  findings  was  published 













The  2006  election  was  triggered  by  the  opposition  parties  defeating  the Martin  Government  on  a 
question of confidence shortly after the Gomery Inquiry released its first report into the ‘sponsorship 
scandal’,  and  concluded  with  the  Conservatives  under  Stephen  Harper  winning  slightly  more  seats 
than  any  other  party  and  forming  a  minority  government.    The  media  coverage  in  this  election, 
according to the Observatory researchers, also did not involve the media in agenda setting.  While the 
campaign began  focused on  the  ‘sponsorship  scandal’,  by  the  second week policy  pronouncements 
had begun to take over, with the Conservative Party taking the lead on such matters as national unity, 
crime and taxes, with other leaders responding, thereby moving issues to the forefront of the media’s 
coverage  (Andrew  et  al.,  2006).    As  for  general  media  coverage  of  the  campaign,  the  researchers 
concluded  that  the Conservatives did,  in  fact,  run a better campaign  than  the Liberals, and  that  the 





the  previous  year,  at  only  48%  of  the  total  coverage  (compared  to  44% which  still  focused  on  the 
election  as  a  ‘horserace’)  it  can  hardly  be  seen  as  an  issue  driven  campaign  based  solely  on  the 
Observatory’s  raw  data  (Media  Observatory,  2009).    No  single  issue  dominated  the  campaign  or 
advantaged  a  political  party.    In  the  3,753  election  articles  written  over  what  was  a  much  longer 
campaign  period,  interrupted  by  a  Christmas  break,  national  unity/separatism  was  the  most 
mentioned  at  8%,  followed  by  taxes  and  the  ‘sponsorship  scandal’  which  tied  at  7%,  and 
defence/foreign affairs and social issues/programmes tied at 6%. 
The 2008  federal election was called by Prime Minister Stephen Harper after  claiming  the House of 
Commons had become unworkable, and while the election call was likely precipitated by a perceived 
strategic advantage, the Conservatives were unable to win a majority of seats though they obtained a 
slightly  larger minority.    As  for  the media  coverage,  the Observatory  researchers  conclude  that  the 
coverage  in  this election was much different  than  the previous campaigns  in  that  the Conservatives 
overwhelmingly  dominated  the media  coverage,  though  this  coverage  did  not  have  a  positive  tone 
according to their new computerized system of coding, leading them to also conclude that it was the 
sheer  volume of  coverage and not  the  content which  advantaged  the Conservatives over  the other 
political  parties  (Andrew et  al.,  2008).    It  should  be  noted  that  stories were  not  identified  as  being 
horserace/campaign  stories  in  this  election.    This  makes  it  impossible  to  determine  the  balance 
between media coverage on electoral competition rather than issues, and to compare this to previous 





for  the  overall  campaign, which  is  a  conclusion  of  the Observatory  researchers who  also  note  that 
even  the  environment  and  the  Liberal  Party’s  controversial  Green  Plan  “was  overshadowed  by  the 
financial  crisis  in  the U.S.”  (Andrew et al., 2008; 79).   The environment came  in at 11%,  just behind 
crime/justice at 13% (Media Observatory, 2009).  
Media Effects 
While  its  post‐election  analysis  did  not  point  to  any  media  effects  –  in  fact  it  suggested  that  the 
predominant  effect  that  could  be  expected  in  an  election,  agenda  setting,  did  not  occur  –  the 
Observatory has since developed a predictive model using its coding for tone, and it has tested daily 
shifts in media tone with and against aggregated polling data collected by the eight Canadian polling 
firms  operating  during  the  2004  and  2006  elections  (Soroka  et  al.,  n.d.).    Using  a  lead  time of  four 
days,  they  found  that  the  addition  of media  tone  to  polling  data  increases  its  predictive  quality  to 
within 1.5 percent of  the public’s  actual  position  (as  evidenced by polls  conducted  four days  later).  
Further,  media  tone  alone  can  explain  as  much  as  75  percent  of  the  variance  between  the  main 
parties’ levels of support.  This, they cautiously suggest, can be seen as evidence of a media effect. 
The  argument  for  a  media  effect  proceeds  as  follows...    The  authors  suggest  that  since  “most 
information about the campaign that citizens receive comes from mass media; it follows that almost 
all movement over a campaign is a media effect” and since the coding the Observatory did for tone is 





The  authors  freely  acknowledge  that  they  cannot  defend  against  the  counter  argument  that 
journalists  are  simply mirrors  for what  is  happening,  so  that  even  their  evidence of  a  lead  time  for 
media tone over vote choice could be the result of journalists’ attentiveness to information the public 
obtains later, and reflects shifts in the mood of the campaign, shifts in public opinion and the views of 












to  the  top by  the media,  then non‐significant  issues  should  remain buried.   And  if  there  is  a media 
and/or  campaign  effect  that  emerges  via  the  tone  of  the mass media,  then  all  issues  become  less 
relevant.  Further, in the two elections for which coding is available (and it is likely true also in 2008), 
stories about  the campaign as a horserace or strategic maneuver  for electoral advantage accounted 
for  half  of  all  the  media,  with  even  the  most  primed  issue  never  getting  over  one‐quarter  of  the 
overall  coverage even  in an  ‘issue’ dominated election.   One would have  to  conclude based on  this 
data that even through self selection it would be a challenge for consumers of mainstream media to 
be swayed by a policy issue which only eked out a single percent of this noisy election coverage.   
Yet  the popular press has characterized  immigration as a central battleground between  the Liberals 
and  the Conservatives  in all  three of  these elections.   This assumption  is based on  the  fact  that  the 
outcome  of  these  elections,  in  terms  of  which  party will  win  the most  seats  in  Parliament,  due  to 
Canada’s  current  electoral  dynamics,  is  being  decided  in  a  handful  of  ridings  in  the  urban  electoral 










immigrant vote  is between the Liberals and the Conservatives”  (Julie Van Dusen,  ibid.).    In  the 2008 
election, one of the co‐directors of the Media Observatory is even quoted as saying that support for 







campaign  over  immigration  is  taking  place,  and  yet  if  an  election  campaign  only  exists  through  the 
communications  media,  then  no  significant  campaign  can  actually  be  seen  to  be  taking  place.  






but  also  local  and  rural  newspapers  across  Canada.    The  key  word  searched  was  the  single  word 
‘immigration’,  and while  this wide casting  resulted  in a  large number of  stories  turning up  that had 
minimal reference to immigration (it identified 1,173 stories in 2004, 3,099 in 2006 and 1,158 in 2008), 
it had the benefit of finding stories with unique immigration dimensions that would have been missed 
using more  refined  search parameters.    From  these  stories,  as will  be noted  in  the  text,  the  ‘world 
wide web’ was periodically used to get a sense for how and if these news items disseminated into the 






divisive  issue  that anti‐immigrant parties have successfully emerged on  the political  scene and have 
been able to not only get a foothold in their legislatures, but in their governments as well (Jupp, 2003; 
Koopmans et al., 2005).  This does not appear to have been the case in Canada, though an argument 
could  be  made  that  the  early  version  of  the  Reform  Party  had  anti‐immigration  elements.    The 
literature  on  immigration, which  is  informed  in  part  by  the  large‐N  studies  of media,  suggests  that 
immigration has remained largely a non‐issue in elections.   
Previous  election  studies  using  the  media  concluded  that,  at  least  from  the  1960s  to  the  1980s, 
immigration was not the subject of partisan debate (Nord, 1997: 152) and may have even enjoyed all 
party  consensus  (Hawkins, 1991: 248‐249),  though  the NDP  is  sometimes  suggested  to be  the most 
supportive of immigration, at least with respect to refugees (Hardcastle et al., 1994: 113). 
There are theories for why immigration has not emerged as a partisan election issue.  One view is that 
political  parties  in  Canada,  at  least  those  which  have  aspirations  of  becoming  government,  have 
avoided the  issue because of a possible backlash  in the public‐at‐large due to the place  immigration 
holds  in  Canada’s  founding  myth  (Reitz,  2004;  Hiebert,  2006).    Another  view  is  that  multicultural 
policies have made Canadians more predisposed towards immigration (Kymlicka, 2005). 
Gallup  reports  that  the majority of Canadians consistently  support  immigration being maintained at 
the same level (Reitz 2004).  Public and elite support does appear to fluctuate some when the media 
raises issues surrounding queue jumping and illegal  immigration, but this is primarily with respect to 
support  for  refugees  (Holton  and  Lanphier,  1994).    And  while  immigration  may  become  a  more 







Of  the  stories which  concerned  immigration published during  the  2004  election period,  some were 
about  immigration  entirely  removed  from  the  campaign,  in  that  they  discussed  the  government 
programme in the context of recently released data or studies on immigration, or they reported on a 
particular immigrant(s) story.   Most articles were directly related to the campaign, and they fell into 
one of  three  categories:  either  reflecting  the  issue being  raised by  a party  leader or party platform 
announcement,  raised  by  local  candidates  in  terms  of  their  stated  priorities  or  raised  by  the 
newspaper in terms of issues which were important to a specific riding they had chosen to highlight. 
The  impression  created  by  the  major  daily  newspapers  is  that  the  immigration  issue  played  out 
without direct engagement in this campaign, which is not true for the local papers, particularly when 




the  announcement  was  local,  and  always  included  reference  to  the  other  parties’  platforms  or 





had  taken  different  positions  on  what  parts  of  the  programme  needed  to  be  improved.    So  it  is 
perhaps not surprising that the National Post, in an editorial on immigration, suggested that the party 
leaders were equally committed to improving the immigration programme, and selected the common 





riding  (the NDP’s  Jack Layton and the Green Party’s  Jim Harris) and that  the all candidates’ meeting 
deteriorated into expletives over the same‐sex marriage question (Black and Hicks, 2008). 
The  local  issue that seemed to get the most attention at the  local  level concerned the  ‘landing fee’. 
This was a $975  fee  imposed on  immigrants as part of  (then Finance Minister) Paul Martin’s deficit 
reduction plan.   The NDP had committed to repealing the  fee, which differentiated them from both 
the  Liberals  and  Conservatives,  and  they  had  dubbed  it  ‘Paul  Martin’s  head  tax’,  alluding  to  the 
discriminatory  $50  fee  imposed  on  Chinese  people  in  the  late  1880s  in  order  to  discourage  more 
immigration from this specific ethnic group once the railroad was completed.  In the riding of Toronto‐
Danforth  where  Layton  was  running,  the  Liberal  MP  even  broke  ranks  with  his  party  and 
acknowledged that the fee was not a “good thing” and suggested that it could be removed since the 
deficit had been eliminated (National Post,  June 22, 2004: A6).   Other Liberal candidates were more 




directly engaging on the same  issue, suggesting a debate over  immigration  in terms of quality  if not 
quantity at the local riding‐level. 
The  leaders’  tours  and  its  capacity  to  dominate  the national media  (Mughan,  2000),  in  a  system of 
strict party discipline, has led many to conclude that local politics could have little influence on voter 
choice  in Canada (see,  for e.g., Lee, 1989; Swanson and Mancini, 1996).   But  it  is still  true that  local 
campaigns offer dramatic variation in terms of the capacity to contact and deliver voters and in terms 
of  the type of candidates,  so at  the very  least  they should be considered as something that has  the 
capacity  to  operate  both  independently  and  symbiotically  with  the  national  campaign  (Carty  and 
Eagles, 2005). 
That we might find a local campaign that had not been captured by the large‐N study which studied 
this  same  election  is  not  surprising.    The  research  design  of  the  large‐N  study was  geared  towards 







of  candidates  who  had  identified  the  immigration  issue  as  their  personal  priority  in  candidates 
meetings and in interviews, and newspapers which identified the issue as being important to a specific 
riding.   The  immigration planks of the party platform were again seen to have been unveiled by the 
political parties  in  immigrant rich ridings, though these now included ridings  in Vancouver, Montreal 
and  Toronto.    Also  different  from  the  previous  election  is  that  the  national  media  increasingly 
reported  direct  engagement  over  the  immigration  platform,  with  the  immigration minister  quoted 
during  the  announcement  of  the  Liberal  immigration  plank  as  saying  the  Conservative  approach  to 
immigration  was  to  “send  them  back  and  keep  them  out”  (BN,  Dec.  22,  2005).    This  shift  likely 
reflected  the  perception  among  the  political  parties  that  this  was  a  very  hotly  contested  election 
(Black and Hicks, 2008). 
Even at the national level we find evidence that immigrant communities are a direct battleground for 
the  Liberals  and  Conservatives.    One  example  of  this  is  the  issue  of  a  formal  governmental  or 
parliamentary apology over the Chinese  ‘head tax’.   This  issue  is particularly  interesting because the 




been given  in other countries  that used similar discriminatory practices, put  the community at odds 
with the political elites (Li, 2008). 
It should be noted that the Chinese‐Canadian Community  is divided between those who oppose the 









Prior  to  the  election,  the  national  media  had  widely  reported  the  Liberal  Government’s 
announcement of an agreement reached with the National Chinese Canadian Congress, which would 
have  put  $2.5  million  into  a  foundation  to  educate  Canadians  about  this  discriminatory  use  of 
immigration  policy,  but  there  was  no  formal  apology  or  compensation  for  individuals;  the 
Conservatives had equally opposed apologizing or offering compensation; while the NDP supported a 
formal apology  from Parliament and  supported direct  financial  compensation.    In  the middle of  the 
campaign Harper announced that as soon as he became Prime Minister he would formally apologize 




as  an  as  yet  unfulfilled  offer.    An  apology  over  a  radio  station was  not  the  goal  of  the  community 
groups which  had  been  demanding  an  apology,  and  it was  not  the  equivalent  to  precedents  set  in 
other  countries.    It  also  appears  that  the divisions within  the Chinese  community  had  a bearing on 
receptiveness  to  initiatives on this  issue.   For example, The Epoch Times, which  is a publication that 




The  other  direct  engagement  over  immigration  which  occurred  at  the  national  level  was  over  the 
landing  fee, which  the NDP had dubbed  in  the previous election  ‘Paul Martin’s head tax’.   As noted 
above, this had been an issue at the local‐level in certain ridings during the previous campaign.  Hours 
before  Stephen  Harper  was  scheduled  to  make  a  major  speech  unveiling  his  party’s  immigration 







A  Google  search  of  the  announcement  that  Martin  had  committed  to  eliminating  the  fee  by  the 
following election turned up over 3,000 websites that retransmitted this story.  A number of these are 
sites specifically aimed at immigrants and immigrant communities (e.g., despardes.com, Jan. 12, 2006; 
workpermit.com,  Jan.  6,  2006),  online  ethnic  publications  likely  to  have  a  Canadian  following  (e.g., 
newsindia‐times.com, Jan. 13, 2006; jamaicaobserver.com Jan. 8, 2006) and new media, such as blogs 
(e.g.,  jaymeister.blogspot.com,  Jan.  4,  2006;  smalldeadanimals.com,  Jan.  4,  2006)  and  websites  of 
non‐governmental organizations that have an active membership (e.g., psacbc.com, Jan. 12, 2006). 







zero  before  the  next  election,  and  these  websites  weighed  the  merits  of  having  a  lower  fee 
immediately against a lower fee in two years time or a promise of no fee in the future.  
The other  interesting  thing about  these  community oriented publications  is  that a number of other 
election stories not carried in national media were published for this community, and some derivative 
stories  were  taken  from  national  or  local  media  and  recast  specifically  for  their  audience.    For 





Again,  the  fact  that  stories  about  immigration  would  be  of  interest  to  the  ethnic  and  immigrant 
oriented  media  is  not  surprising.    What  is  interesting  though  is  the  difference  in  tone  –  with  no 
interest  in campaign machinations, only  in  the actual  specifics of  the announcements and how they 
might impact on immigrants.  The only ‘spin’ which could be seen to emerge was a sense of pride in 
the  attention  the  community was  receiving  from  certain  parties,  and  this  inevitable was  offered  to 




immigration  policy/programme  and  some  about  immigrants,  independent  from  the  campaign,  and 
campaign  stories  that  identified  immigration  as  an  issue  for  the  party  leader,  party  platform,  local 
candidates  and  particular  ridings.    Again  we  have  evidence  of  a  local  riding  campaign  and  ethnic 
community  oriented  campaign  which  is  more  involved  than  might  be  evident  from  the  national 
election coverage or the larger news outlets. 
There  is, however, an event  that  is worthy of closer examination because  it appears  to offer  insight 
into a relationship that may exist between news reporting and voter behaviour not as yet explored, 











own  in a  similar manner.    In  an  interview with a Calgary news magazine, Fast  Forward Weekly,  the 
local Conservative candidate Lee Richardson responded to a question about gun violence by referring 
to  the  diversity  in  Canada’s  cities  created  by  immigration  (the  quotes  can  be  found  at 













similar  connections  between  inner  city  gang  crime  and  urban  ethnic  diversity  with  no  negative 
reaction offered or reported by the media (see nationalpost.com, Sept. 25, 2008). 
So why would this incident, aside from occurring in the middle of an election, warrant a reaction when 
similar  comments  went  unnoticed?    One  possibility  is  that  these  moments  have  resonance  well 
beyond  the  event,  because  they  tap  into  an  already  existing  suspicion  that  voters  have  about  the 
person  or  party  in  question.    Much  in  the  way  a  satirical  cartoon  can  strike  a  cord,  they  offer  an 
‘emotional heuristic’.  









to poor decision making, and  suggests  that  they are  confined  to persons with  low  information, and 
this  is  true  in  psychology,  law  and  business  management  where  heuristic  decision  making  at  the 





There was,  for many  Canadians,  a  sense  that  Dion was  not  prepared  to  be  Prime Minister,  so  the 
relevance  of  the  story  that  he  had  stumbled  in  answering  a  question  lay  not  in  the  details  of  the 
incident but in the way it encapsulated those voters’ unease.  The reason the Richardson incident had 
resonance for people concerned with the immigration file, and the earlier similar comments did not, 
was because  for  those directly  concerned with  the  immigration  file  there has  long been a  suspicion 
that  remnants  of  the  old  Reform Party  remain  in  the  new Conservative  Party,  and  that  this  party’s 
newfound support for immigration may not be genuine. 
At  this  stage,  a  number  of  quantitative  methods  spring  to  mind  for  how  to  further  explore  this 
possibility,  of  which  experiments  may  offer  the  most  direct  path,  but  it  is  hard  to  see  how  the 
possibility  of  this  effect  occurring  would  have  been  identified  via  a  large‐N media  study,  unless  of 






A popular Vancouver blog site  (straight.com, Sept. 22, 2008) during  the 2008 election  reported  that 
almost half of Chinese voters who responded to their on‐line poll said relations with China – the issue 
that the Conservatives had been, since the 2006 election, attempting to stake out different ground on 
– was  their primary  issue  for deciding how to vote  (in what  the  large‐N media study suggested was 
singularly an ‘economy’ election).  The accuracy of this web poll is unimportant.  That some people see 
their culture as so defining that  it would dictate their vote choice is what  is relevant.    It  is this same 
identity perspective that made an apology for the Chinese head tax so key to their community and yet 
was lost on politicians and Canadian society at large for decades. 
It  is  safe  to  say  with  confidence  that  for  some  groups,  particular  minority  groups  which  have 
experienced  oppression  or  discrimination,  identity  issues  will  dominate  much  of  what  they  do, 
whether  it  be  the  way  they  dress,  their  opinions  and  attitudes  or  social  networking,  whether  this 
identity  comes  from race, ethnicity,  sexual orientation or  shared history,  language and culture.    For 
these  people,  it  seems  that  identity  is  a  permanent  top‐of‐mind  issue.    This  explains  the  elevated 
significance for an issue like immigration to a community like Chinese Canadians, something that goes 
beyond the level warranted by the media coverage it received during these election campaigns. 





As was noted above, one of  the stories  that  ran  in  the 2008 election  involved a number of  scholars 
confirming the media’s suspicion that there might be a shift in loyalty occurring among the immigrant 
community, which has been historically loyal to the Liberals.  The more interesting question is why has 
there  been  such  resistance  to  inroads  by  the  Conservatives.    This  idea  of  a  permanent  top‐of‐mind 
issue offers one explanation.    If  identity  issues are a permanent  top‐of‐mind  issue and  this  leads  to 
high information, then there will be a natural resistance to new information.  Campaign promises on 
an  issue  like  immigration, or promises of  future apologies over past wrongs, will not be  looked at  in 
the context of the campaign drama, but will be filtered through a substantive body of knowledge and 
experience. 
If we  use  the  persons who work  on  specialty websites  as  a  proxy  for  the  informed  citizen  in  these 
communities, then we can look at the websites themselves as a reflection of this very thought process.  
These sites were not swayed by the more general media effects suggested in the large‐N study (tone 




But  if  those who have high knowledge are  resistant  to new  information,  then why would a  story of 
campaign  theatre,  like  Lee Richardson  commenting on  violence  committed by ethnic  gangs  in  cities 
suddenly become of  interest  to  this  community  (when previous  similar  comments by politicians did 
not)?    The  use  of  cognitive  heuristics  and  information  shortcuts  favoured  by  people who  have  low 




increase  their  information.    The  suggestion  offered  here  is  that  the  event  offered  an  emotional 
heuristic.  It is possible that an emotional heuristic is able to penetrate the barrier of high information 
specifically  because  it  plays  to  emotion  rather  than  reason.    At  the  very  least,  it  appears  to  have 
encapsulated a disquiet  that already existed.   And people who have an  issue at  the  top‐of‐mind, as 
they are thinking with some intensity about it, may be more prone to certain emotions, such as doubt.   
So  what  about  the  Dion  ‘do  over’  incident?    Was  this  a  significant  issue  only  for  those  with  less 
information?  Here we can use journalists in the mainstream media as a proxy for the informed voter.  
Running this story, both the first time by the CTV station which then came under criticism for doing so, 





The  question  of  Dion’s  preparedness  to  govern  had  been  an  issue  in  the  election.    While  the 
Observatory did not code horserace versus issue stories, we can assume based on previous elections 
that  between  45  and  55  percent  of  the  coverage  focused  on  the  machinations  of  the  campaign.  
Leadership is thus always a top‐of‐mind issue for voters.  So a conclusion may be, given both the Dion 
and  Richardson  incidents,  that  top‐of‐mind  issues,  whether  permanent  or  media  induced,  may  be 
susceptible to emotional heuristics.   This suggests a number of research possibilities and avenues to 
explore by both qualitative and quantitative researchers. 
This  paper  set  out  to determine whether or  not  a  qualitative  approach  could  contribute  something 
distinct to that which was being found by a large‐N media study, using an analysis of the news stories 
surrounding a  single policy  issue  for  the  same  three elections.      This  goal has been met,  as  there  is 
evidence  of  a  campaign  involving  immigration  occurring  at  the  local  riding‐  and  ethnic  community‐
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